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Article 2

Banks: Responses to Ten Questions

RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS
William C. Banks'
9. Is the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 good policy?
constitutional?

Is it

It is widely understood that the political dynamics that led to
the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
in 1978 were unique, and that the inter-branch compromises
reached then authorized the means for electronic collection of
foreign intelligence that served the Nation well for many years.
The basic idea was simple: the Government can conduct intrusive
electronic surveillance of Americans or others lawfully in the
United States without traditional probable cause to believe that
they had committed a crime, if it could demonstrate to a special
Article III court that it had a different kind of probable cause:
reason to believe that they are acting on behalf of foreign powers.
Since then, critics argue that the basic patchwork-like
architecture of FISA became too rigid, too complicated, and too
unforgiving to enable effective intelligence responses to crises.
Would-be targets of surveillance are communicating in ways that
stress or evade the FISA system (when, for example, the location of
the target is difficult or impossible to determine). Because of
switching technology, collection inside the United States is now
often the best or only way to acquire even foreign-to-foreign
communications.
Furthermore, powerful computers and data
mining techniques now permit computers to select potential
surveillance targets from electronic databases of previously
unimaginable size.
The wholesale quality of such computer
collection and data mining is incompatible with the retail scope of
the original FISA process. At the same time, more Americans than
ever are engaged in international communications and there is far
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greater intelligence interest in communications to and from
Americans. Both circumstances increase the likelihood that the
Government will be intercepting communications of innocent
Americans, raising as many questions about the adequacy of the
FISA safeguards, as about the adaptability of FISA architecture.
This tension forms the context for a series of post-1978
amendments to FISA, culminating in the FISA Amendments Act of
2008 (FAA), which this essay examines.
THE ORIGINAL ARCHITECTURE

Until the 2008 amendments, FISA governed the electronic
surveillance of persons in the United States for the purpose of
collecting foreign intelligence. (FISA did not apply to surveillance
conducted outside the United States, or to foreign-to-foreign
telephone communications intercepted within the United States.)
FISA "probable cause" required that targets of the surveillance had
to be a "foreign power," an "agent of a foreign power," or, since
2004, a "lone wolf' terrorism suspect. Applications had to specify
"facilities" where the surveillance would be directed and provide
"minimization" procedures to assure that the "acquisition" of
collected information would not be disseminated or retained
outside authorized bounds. A special court that meets in secret was
created to hear requests for orders to conduct the surveillance.
For a long time, the process worked well as a mechanism to
regulate surveillance of known intelligence targets. The FISA
process and its eventual orders have always been limited, however.
FISA was concerned with "acquisition," not with the uses the
Government might have for what is collected. FISA also assumed
that officials know where the target is and what "facilities" he will
use for his communications. Knowing this much enabled the
Government to demonstrate the required "probable cause" to
believe that the target was an agent of a foreign power, or more
recently, a lone wolf. FISA did not authorize intelligence collection
for the purpose of identifying the targets of surveillance, by
collecting aggregate communications traffic and then identifying
the surveillance target. In other words, FISA envisioned casespecific surveillance, not a generic surveillance operation, and its
approval architecture was accordingly geared to specific, narrowly
targeted applications. FISA was also based on the recognition that
persons lawfully in the United States have constitutional privacy
and free expression rights that stand in the way of unfettered
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government surveillance.
TECHNOLOGICAL STRESSES ON THE ORIGINAL ARCHITECTURE

With the revolution in digital communications, however, the
idea of a geographic border has become an increasingly less viable
marker for legal authorities and their limits. Using the Internet,
packets of data that constitute messages travel in disparate ways
through networks, many of which come through or end up in the
United States. Those packets, countless Skype calls, and instant
messages originate from the United States in growing numbers.
Nor do we think of our international communications as being in
any way less private than our domestic calls. Because FISA was
written to apply to broadly defined forms of "electronic
surveillance" acquired inside the United States, digital technologies
brought interception of previously unregulated communications
Meanwhile, civil liberties groups
inside the FISA scheme.
complained that the data mining that was going on more or less
without regulation was leading inexorably to greater governmental
intrusions into our privacy.
Changing technologies have also turned the traditional
sequence of FISA processes on its head. Just as we discovered after
September 11 that investigators could enter transactional data
about potential terrorists and come up with a list that included five
of the hijackers-a sort of reverse of the typical FISA-supported
investigation-our intelligence agencies now see the potential
benefits of data mining as a means of developing the suspects that
could be targets in the traditional FISA framework.
THE PRESIDENT RESPONDS:

THE TERRORIST

SURVEILLANCE

PROGRAM

After September 11, President Bush ordered an expanded
program of electronic surveillance by the National Security Agency
(NSA). In December 2005, the New York Times reported that
President Bush secretly authorized the NSA to eavesdrop on
Americans and others inside the United States to search for
evidence of terrorist activity without obtaining orders from the
FISA court. Although the details of what came to be called the
Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) have not been made public,
the NSA had monitored the telephone and e-mail communications
of thousands of persons inside the United States where one end of
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the communication was outside the United States and where there
were reasonable grounds to believe that a party to the international
communication was affiliated with al Qaeda or a related
organization.
From news accounts and statements by Bush administration
officials, it appears that the TSP operated in stages. With the
cooperation of the telecommunications companies, the NSA first
swept up all the traffic entering the United States at switching
stations-so-called
vacuum
cleaner
surveillance-wholesale
collection.
Second, that transactional data-addressing
information, subject lines, and perhaps some message contentwas computer mined for indications of terrorist activity. Third, as
patterns or indications of terrorist activity were uncovered,
intelligence officials at the NSA reviewed the collected data to
ferret out potential threats, at the direction of NSA supervisors.
Finally, the targets selected as potential threats were referred to the
FBI for further investigation, pursuant to FISA, and the human
surveillance ended for the others.
At first the Bush administration defended the legality of the
TSP vigorously, but it was an uphill struggle. First, to the extent
that the TSP targeted U.S. persons inside the United States, at least
some portions of its surveillance were almost surely "electronic
surveillance" as defined by FISA,' which in turn required
applications for court orders to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC). To the extent that Americans were only
incidentally targeted, the definition less clearly applies to the
collection.
Second, for foreign targets abroad, data arriving in the United
States by satellite has always been unregulated by FISA, ironically
because Congress was careful in 1978 not to reach NSA surveillance
of radio traffic all over the world. But for digital traffic on fiberoptic cables FISA applied to collection inside the United States.
(FISA did not apply if the surveillance occurred abroad, even if the
call or e-mail was to an American inside the United States.)

1. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (f)(1) (2000) (defining "electronic surveillance" as "the
acquisition by an electronic . . . device of the contents of any wire or radio
communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United
States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by
intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required
for law enforcement purposes").

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss5/2

4

Banks: Responses to Ten Questions

2009]

TEN QUESTIONS: BANKS

5011

Third, FISA applications had to identify "targets" and
"facilities" to be monitored, and the FISC had to make findings
about each. There had to be probable cause that the target was a
foreign power or its agents (or lone wolves) and the facilities had to
be used, or about to be used, by the targets. As such, there was no
way that FISA could have supported the wholesale, "vacuuming"
programmatic surveillance as implemented by the TSP.
Fourth, Justice Department efforts to construe exclusivity and
emergency provisions in FISA not to stand in the way of the
executive program were not persuasive, and the constitutional
arguments made in support of the TSP were based on courts of
appeal decisions that permitted warrantless electronic surveillance
for foreign intelligence purposes before FISA was enacted. FISA
changed the constitutional calculus, and it provided a
comprehensive scheme for regulating electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence collection.
FITING TSP WITHIN FISA?

When the FISC took over administration of the TSP program
in January 2007, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales advised the
Senate Judiciary Committee that a FISC judge "issued orders
authorizing the Government to target for collection international
communications into or out of the United States where there is
probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a
member • or
agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist
.
,,2
organization.
(He thus implicitly conceded that, notwithstanding
the prior arguments made in support of the TSP, it did fall, after
all, within the scope of FISA.) According to the Attorney General,
all surveillance that had been occurring under the TSP would now
be conducted with the approval of the FISC. He also stated that
the President would not reauthorize the TSP when its current
authorization expires.
Although we do not know for certain (as the orders have not
been published), the January 2007 orders must have authorized
surveillance of very broadly defined "targets" and "facilities." Al
Qaeda and "associated terrorist organizations" could have been
"targets" as a foreign power, because the original legislative history
2.
Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Patrick Leahy,
U.S. Senator, & Arlen Specter, U.S. Senator (Jan. 17, 2007), available at
http://Nwv.fas.org/irp/congress/2007-cr/fisa011707.html.
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of FISA explains that the term refers to the "individual or entity
about whom or from whom information is sought." A group may
be the target, even though the surveillance is directed at
individuals. The traditional conception of "facilities" in FISA,
however, is narrow, such as a single phone line or a single e-mail
address. It could be interpreted broadly as place, and if it was
construed to include the international switches owned by the
telecom companies, surely al Qaeda and its affiliates use the
switches in their international communications. Of course, lots of
other people that have no connections to terrorism use those
switches, too. Logically, if a switch can be a "facility," so too can all
of Yahoo or Google, or even the U.S. telecom system or the
Internet. If "facilities" is construed too broadly, the TSP may
violate the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment
and the long-standing proscription on general warrants.
The FISC might have counter-balanced such particularity
concerns about "facility" by proposing more rigorous minimization
procedures, required by FISA since 1978 to "minimize the
acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination" of
nonpublic information about U.S. persons. The January 2007 FISC
orders may have directed the Government to record the
communications of only the portion of the switch used by the
targets. The filtering capabilities of the government technology
may permit it to do that. Then the probable cause determinations
noted by the Attorney General and apparently approved by the
FISC could have been made by executive branch personnel for
follow-on surveillance, subject only to after-the-fact review by the
FISC.
THE PROTECT AMERICA ACT OF 2007

Notwithstanding this speculative reasoning in support of the
TSP under FISA, a different FISCjudge decided in May 2007 not to
continue approval of what had been the TSP under FISC
supervision, and apparently determined that at least some of the
foreign communications acquired in the United States are subject
to individualized FISA processes.
After a backlog of FISA
applications developed, the Bush administration successfully
persuaded Congress to pass statutory authorization for the
program.
The administration emphasized the need to amend FISA to
account for changes in technology and thus enable it to conduct
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surveillance of foreign digital communications from within the
United States. Yet providing statutory access to U.S. digital
telecommunications switches would enable the NSA to access email traffic traveling to or from U.S. servers, thus opening up a vast
swath of U.S. person communications for government scrutiny.
As enacted in August 2007, the Protect America Act (PAA)
determined that the definition of "electronic surveillance" in FISA
should not extend to surveillance of a person reasonably believed
to be outside the United States.3 The PAA also permitted the
Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to
authorize collection of foreign intelligence "directed at" persons
reasonably believed to be outside the United States, without
obtaining an order from the FISC, even if one party to the
communication was a U.S. citizen inside the United States. The
PAA thus made less onerous the determination that the target is
known to be abroad. Comparing the PAA to the TSP, the main
differences were that the TSP allowed surveillance of targets inside
the United States, and the predicate for collection authority under
the PAA was the location of the target, not his status in relation to a
foreign power or terrorist organization (as it was under the TSP).
THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008

The PAA expired by its own terms in February 2008 after
Congress and the Bush administration failed to agree on a set of
provisions that would grant broad, retroactive immunity to firms
that participated in the TSP. The FISA Amendments Act of 2008
(FAA), enacted in July 2008, conferred the immunity sought by the
administration and the telecommunications industry, but it
insufficiently addressed important issues that continue to stand in
the way of an effective legislative scheme for foreign intelligence
surveillance.4
In essence, the FAA codified the PAA, with some additional
wrinkles. The core of the new subtitle of FISA retains the PAA
broad-based authorization to collect information "targeting"
persons "reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States to acquire foreign intelligence information." As with the
PAA and the TSP, the FAA does not limit the Government to
surveillance of particular, known persons reasonably believed to be
3.

Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552.

4.

FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261,122 Stat. 2436.
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outside the United States, but instead permits so-called "vacuum
cleaner" surveillance and data mining. In addition, the FAA targets
do not have to be suspected of being an agent of a foreign power
or, for that matter, they do not have to be suspected of terrorism or
any national security offense, so long as the collection of foreign
intelligence is a significant purpose of the surveillance.
Surveillance might be directed at a terrorist organization, a
telephone number or e-mail address, or perhaps at an entire ISP or
area code. Unlike traditional FISA applications, the surveillance
permitted under the FAA does not require that the Government
identify a particular known facility where the intercepted
communications occur. On the positive side, for the first time
surveillance targeting a U.S. citizen abroad is subject to FISA
procedures, although those procedures are less demanding of the
Government than traditional FISA surveillance conducted inside
the United States.
A few attributes of the programmatic surveillance authorized
by the FAA mark stark changes in FISA. First, some of the
intercepted communications will be to or from American citizens
(only intentional targeting of Americans is prohibited), and the
surveillance producing the intercepts will not have been reviewed
under pre-existing FISA requirements that the target be an agent of
a foreign power or a lone wolf terrorist. Even the TSP targeted
communications only where one party was outside the United
States and there was probable cause to believe that at least one
party to the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or
an affiliated organization. The FAA eliminates any showing of
individualized suspicion, even where communications of American
citizens are the foreseeable consequence of the program orders.
Second, the Attorney General submits classified procedures to
the FISC by which the Government will determine that acquisitions
conducted under the program meet the program targeting
objectives and satisfy traditional FISA minimization procedures.
After a judge approves the program features, executive branch
officials authorize the surveillance and issue directives compelling
Although details of the
communications carriers to assist.
implementation of the program authorized by the FAA are not
known, a best guess is the Government uses a broad vacuum
cleaner-like first stage of collection, focusing on transactional data,
where wholesale interception occurs following the development
and implementation of filtering criteria. Then the NSA engages in
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a more particularized collection of content after analyzing mined
data. Although traditional FISA orders are still required for
"intentional acquisition" of domestic communications, accidental
or incidental acquisition of U.S. persons inside the United States
surely occurs, especially in light of the difficulty of ascertaining a
target's location. Nor do the minimization rules require the
Government to discard communications of U.S. persons
incidentally collected when the Government is targeting someone
abroad. NSA may decide to retain any communications that
constitute foreign intelligence, and there is no review of the NSA
decisions.
A third problematic feature of the FAA is, ironically, that the
legislation follows the thirty-year FISA model of focusing on targets
and their location for the purposes of authorizing and
conditioning surveillance and data collection.
With modern
communications capabilities, it is not possible to tell reliably in
many cases where an individual is when a communication is made.
From the Government's perspective, the downside of relying on a
target's location as a basis for conducting lawful surveillance was
softened when the PAA and FAA provided that the Government
had only to reasonably believe that the target is abroad. However,
one inevitable problem with the relaxed standard is that more
warrantless surveillance of persons inside the United States will
occur.
Fourth, whatever one thinks of the constitutionality or policy
value of the programmatic surveillance authorized by the FAA, the
legislation fails to prescribe processes for what happens next with
the data that is collected through the approved program. On what
bases and according to what processes and accountability
mechanisms do officials determine to look more closely at
individualized pieces of the traffic?
Apparently, NSA used
algorithms that purported to identify terrorist suspects out of the
vacuumed mass of data. How exactly could such a data-driven
process sort the innocuous call to me from my Muslim friend
abroad from one that is worthy of further investigation? Is the
limited human follow-on surveillance then a minimal intrusion that
we should be prepared to accept, if we are assured that the brief
surveillance will end and a traditional FISA application would
follow as if further electronic surveillance is deemed worthwhile?
Finally, under the FAA what can the Government do with
information acquired about U.S. persons who communicate with
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foreign targets? Rules for dealing with "incidentally collected" U.S.person information were developed when America's primary
national security focus was overseas. The current focus on calls
coming into and out of the United States will require some
adjustments in managing the risk of acquiring communications of
innocent Americans. As it now stands, minimization does not
prevent the Government from retaining information incidentally
collected on Americans.
CONCLUSION
When I first became a student of FISA, twenty years ago, I
struggled to understand when a friend, who worked inside the FISA
process, told me that we should worry less about what is collected
and how, and more about how what is collected is used. Eventually
I learned about the importance of the now-lowered wall that
separated foreign intelligence from law enforcement, and about
how minimization could protect private information.
Meanwhile the digital revolution and our data-driven society
resulted in private industry having access to personal identifying
information about most Americans.
The constitutional and
statutory law grew up around the premise that our voluntary
sharing of that personal information with our credit card
companies and ISPs and banks eliminated any reasonable
expectation of privacy in that information. When the Government
more prominently and aggressively began collecting and then
mining that stream of data, especially after September 11, through
pen registers, trap and trace devices, national security letters, and
acquisition of so-called "business records," only a few limits were set
on their use. Yet when the TSP was exposed, based on the same
techniques, there was widespread condemnation of the Bush
administration. Why?
Part of the reason is that Americans did not know that the
Government
could
be sucking
up
our
international
telecommunications traffic, incoming and outgoing, and we
suddenly feared that our conversations and e-mails were being read
by someone at the NSA. Once we learned more about the
program, we also feared that officials were continuing to monitor
our communications, without cause and without the approval of
any judge.
As we learned more about the TSP and its follow-on iterations,
as authorized by the FISC and then Congress, it became clear that
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the real privacy intrusion occurs not at the initial stage of flagging
our calls or e-mails, but at the point that someone looking at
aggregate data for patterns or suspicious activity decides to
personally review an individual's communications. In other words,
we should be worried about what the data is used for, not that it is
collected.
Although information sharing has been a mantra in recent
years, and curtailing the uses of collected data cuts against sharing,
important reasons exist for imposing controls in the newest FISA
program. Data mining is more than the "automation of traditional
investigative skills."5 The "automation" may have a greater impact
on personal privacy because the mass of data mined will generate
more false positives than traditional police work, and absent
controls, the data may be preserved indefinitely for any use,
including human review. To defend data mining by arguing that
computers are not sentient beings and thus cannot invade privacy
is to ignore what happens to the data after it is mined.
The PATRIOT Act amendments to FISA were made
permanent in 2005, but the lone wolf provision, added by the
intelligence reform legislation in 2004, sunsets at the end of 2009.
The Justice Department will undoubtedly seek reauthorization of
these provisions before they expire, providing a good opportunity
to revisit the shortcomings in FISA. Lone wolf presents its own
challenge to the integrity of FISA-the authority to conduct secret
electronic surveillance of an individual who engages in terrorist
activities effectively eliminates the need to demonstrate foreign
agency that had always been part of the Government's obligation in
a FISA application. Regardless of whether Congress rethinks how it
describes the categories of potential targets for traditional FISA
surveillance, it should take advantage of the lone wolf
reauthorization to provide greater controls and accountability for
the data mining and follow-on surveillance authorized by the FAA.

5. ContraK. A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connectingthe Dots to
Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REv. 2, 50 (2003) ("[D]ata mining is
no more than the computational automation of traditional investigative skills
....
.).
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